This contribution discusses the Dutch legislative implementation process of the Pillar 2 Directive and the specific choices the Dutch legislator made when implementing the Directive in national law.
1 Introduction
Like Sweden, the Netherlands is a member of the European Union (EU), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework (IF). Therefore, in the same way as Sweden, the Netherlands was committed to implementing the Pillar 2 Directive1 in its national law. For that reason, there are many similarities between the Swedish and Dutch legislation on the minimum tax.
This contribution does not discuss the more general features of the Dutch implementation legislation of the Pillar 2 Directive. Instead, it discusses the Dutch legislative process and the specific choices the Dutch legislator made. These choices might differ, for example, from the choices of the Swedish legislator. This article will take a Dutch perspective and does not include a legal comparison with other jurisdictions.
Council Directive (EU) 2022/2523 of 14 December 2022 on ensuring a global minimum level of taxation for multinational enterprise groups and large-scale domestic groups in the Union.
2 The legislative process and the role of parliament
2.1 Active government
The Netherlands was a front runner in transforming the Pillar 2 Directive in national legislation.2 A draft version of the Dutch legislative proposal was already published for a public consultation on the 24th of October 2022,3 almost two months before the Directive was formally agreed on. The Dutch consultation draft was based on the 16th of June 2022 compromise wording of the Directive. It had primarily a technical character. The government opted for this early consultation to both be able to meet the tight implementation deadline and to benefit from consultation reactions to improve the quality of the legislation.4 In this respect, it is important to mention that the legislative process in the Netherlands always requires a certain amount of time. This is caused by the fact that the Dutch constitution requires an obligatory advice of the Advisory Division of the Council of State5 before a legislative proposal may be sent to parliament. The government may use this advice to amend (or withdraw) the proposal and must write a reaction on it. Only then it can send the legislative proposal to parliament. At that stage the full proposal is made public. The legislative proposal must first be adopted by the House of Representatives6 and subsequently by the Senate.7 Where the House of Representatives may make amendments to a proposal, the Senate can only adopt or reject a proposal.
The public consultation resulted in 16 public reactions.8 These included reactions of the Dutch Association of Tax Advisers, the Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers (VNO-NCW), Tax Justice the Netherlands, the Royal Association of Netherlands Shipowners, the American Chamber of Commerce in the Netherlands (AmCham), American Tower Corporation, the Netherlands British Chamber of Commerce, the Dutch Association of Insurers, two tax consultancy firms and of several individuals applauding a minimum tax. The consultation led to some changes in the proposal.9
A little more than three months later, on the 29th of March 2023, the legislative proposal was sent to the Council of State. The Council of State gave its advice on the 17th of May 2023.10 Within two weeks, on the 31th of May 2023, the government sent the legislative proposal to the House of Representatives.
Ministry of Finance, Nederland loopt in Europa voorop met de implementatie van het wetsvoorstel Wet minimumbelasting 2024 (Pijler 2), https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2023/05/31/nederland-loopt-in-europa-voorop-met-de-implementatie-van-het-wetsvoorstel-wet-minimumbelasting-2024-pijler-2.
Conceptwetsvoorstel Wet minimumbelasting 2024 (Pijler 2), https://www.internetconsultatie.nl/minimumbelasting2024/b1.
Introduction to the consultation, https://www.internetconsultatie.nl/minimumbelasting2024/b1.
The Council of State is one of the High Councils of State of the Netherlands. These are bodies regulated by Constitution, which carry out their tasks independently of the government. Based on article 73(1) and article 75 of the Dutch Constitution (Grondwet) and the Council of State Act, the government must, in principle, ask the Advisory Division for advice on, amongst others, all legislative proposals and can only send legislative proposals to parliament if these are accompanied by this advice and the reaction of the government on the advice. See for more information in English on the Council of State, the English translation of the Council of State Act and the assessment framework the Advisory Division uses to assess legialative proposals https://www.raadvanstate.nl/talen/artikel/.
Official name in Dutch: Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal.
Official name in Dutch: Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal.
https://www.internetconsultatie.nl/minimumbelasting2024/reacties/datum.
Kamerstukken II, 2022–2023, 36369, no. 3, p. 58 and Handelingen I, 12 December 2023, EK 12-12-12.
Raad van State, Advies inzake de invoering van de Wet minimumbelasting 2024 en enkele wijzigingen in de Algemene wet inzake rijksbelastingen en in de Invorderingswet 1990, 17 May 2023, W06.23.00077/III, https://www.raadvanstate.nl/adviezen/@136581/w06-23-00077-iii/. The Council of State must make the advice public within two weeks, this happened on 22 May 2023.
2.2 Cold feet in the Senate
The House of Representatives voted in favor of the legislation on the 26th of October 2023 with a large majority of 140 of the 150 votes (93 %). Only three small right-wing parties voted against the proposal (two members of the House of Representatives were absent). The most interesting discussion on the proposal was in the Senate. The Senate is specifically supposed to do the final test (the Council of State also includes such test in its advice) on the constitutionality of a proposal as Dutch judges are not allowed to test legislation against the constitution.11
The largest party in the Senate, the populist Farmers Citizens Movement Party,12 (16 seats) was very critical. Their spokesperson, a tax lawyer, doubted whether the proposal would reach its goals, would be executable and pointed at the uncertainty of the income or even costs for the Netherlands. He also feared that it would ‘surrender’ the Dutch tax base to the International Accounting Standards Board. He deemed this unconstitutional13 and argued that the Pillar 2 Directive might be disproportional as a simpler and less intrusive system would be possible in the EU. He suggested that the Pillar 2 Directive might be deemed invalid by the Court of Justice of the European Union.14 The State Secretary of Finance at the time (also a tax lawyer and former EY partner) acknowledged it was the most complex piece of legislation he had ever seen, but pointed out that the Directive just had to be implemented as otherwise the European Commission could impose fines or start an infringement procedure.
Members of the Senate also asked questions on the limited role of parliament in the establishment of the Pillar 2 rules.15 The government answered these questions under the heading ‘democratic safeguards’.16 It was of the view that it extensively informed parliament during the whole process of establishing the Pillar 2 model rules in the IF and the proposal on the Pillar 2 Directive, and referred to letters it sent to parliament between 2018 and 2023. This, in the view of the government, gave parliament the possibility to influence the Dutch position in the negotiations. Government recalled that parliament (predominantly the House of Representatives) asked for a speedy implementation of the rules. The government also pointed out that parliament raised questions on the implementation, complexity and mechanics of the rules and that the government duly answered these questions. Also, the government observed that parliament was continuously informed on the negotiations in the Council as the annotated agenda of meetings was sent to parliament before these meetings and a report was sent to parliament after the meetings. The government also pointed out to the Senate that it organized a public technical meeting for the House of Representatives in which the background, establishment, and the main features of the legislative proposal were discussed. Basically, the government told the members of the Senate, who are supposed to specifically test the constitutionality of Dutch legislative proposals, that they were too late and should have raised their concerns at an earlier stage.
In such (much) earlier stage, De Wilde had raised questions on legitimacy and the inclusion of parliament. For example, in 2020 he took the view that the issues under discussion were of too big a relevance to make the outcome dependent on bureaucratic processes.17 In 2022, in a comment on a letter of the 7th of March 2022 in which the government answered questions of parliament on the proposed Pillar 2 Directive, he lamented that these questions and answers felt a bit like a ritual and obligatory dance as everything had already happened: the embracement by the Netherlands of the international political agreement in 2021, the publication of the OECD model rules and the Pillar 2 Directive. He compared it to waking up in a train to discover we took the wrong train and then start a discussion on the exact time we will arrive at the destination.18 In reaction to the discussion between the government and the Senate in November 2023, De Wilde commented that the representatives of the people, guardians of the democracy, had been asleep and that they themselves decimated their role and responsibility to an almost ceremonial one.19
On the 19th of December 2023, the Senate adopted the proposal with 54 of the 75 votes (72%). The populist Farmers and Citizens Party voted against the proposal, whereas the only seat it had at the time of the voting in the House of Representatives, had voted in favor. On the 31st of December 2023, the Minimum Taxation Act 2024 (Wet minimumbelasting 2024)20 entered into force.
Article 120 of the Dutch Constitution. Judges are allowed to test legislation against international treaties such as the European Convention on Human Rights.
BoerBurgerBeweging (BBB).
See for a general discussion on the role of parliaments in relation to supra-national rules: Sigrid Hemels, ‘Tax Autonomy From a Member State Perspective: Are we Faced with a Democratic Deficit?’ in: Raymond Luja (ed.), National Tax Autonomy and the European Union, IBFD Amsterdam 2024, p. 1–42. https://doi.org/10.59403/q7f293001.
Handelingen I, 11 December 2023, EK 11-3-5.
In the Netherlands, the profit tax base is not derived from accounting standards.
Kamerstukken I, 2023–2024, 36369, C, p. 2–4.
M.F. de Wilde, Reactie staatssecretaris op herziening van het internationale winstsysteem, NTFR 2020/615.
M.F. de Wilde, Aanbiedingsbrief antwoorden Kamervragen over BNC-fiche minimumniveau aan belastingheffing (Pijler 2), NTFR 2022/1446.
M.F. de Wilde, Nota naar aanleiding van het verslag Eerste Kamer Wet minimumbelasting 2024 (Pijler 2), NTFR 2023/2015.
Wet van 20 december 2023 tot invoering van een minimumbelasting en wijziging van de Algemene wet inzake rijksbelastingen en de Invorderingswet 1990 in verband met de implementatie van Richtlijn (EU) 2022/2523 van de Raad van 14 december 2022 tot waarborging van een mondiaal minimumniveau van belastingheffing voor groepen van multinationale ondernemingen en omvangrijke binnenlandse groepen in de Unie (PbEU 2022, L 328/1) (Wet minimumbelasting 2024), Staatsblad 2023/510.
3 Estimated income and costs for the Netherlands
Originally, the Dutch government expected a total additional annual tax income because of the minimum tax of € 1.000 million. However, when the legislative proposal was sent to parliament, the government had already lower expectations of the additional income that the tax would raise. At that time, it was estimated that the top-up tax would raise € 55 million per year on a structural basis, the income inclusion rule (IIR) and the undertaxed payments rule (UTPR) € 9 million and that additional income from profit shifting to the Netherlands from low tax jurisdictions would be € 402 million. However, the government warned that these were rough estimations based on data from Dutch corporate income tax returns 2016–2020 (top-up tax) and Country by Country Reporting microdata for 2017–2020 and that especially the last estimation was highly uncertain as it depended on an estimation of behavioral reactions.21
As the previous estimated amount of € 1.000 million had already been used to finance expenditures, the 2024 Budget had to make up for this deficit. The additional income was not found in the corporate income tax domain, but in raising the social insurance premium for the work disability fund (€ 199 million), in lowering the profit exemption for the self-employed in the individual income tax (€ 180 million) and in an increase in the alcohol and tobacco excises (€ 183 million).22 This means that the downward amendment of the estimated minimum tax income already became a cost to employers, self-employed, smokers and alcohol consumers.
Furthermore, in January 2024, the Dutch public broadcasting corporation published a news item stating that US multinationals with presence in the Netherlands restructured in 2023 to escape the Dutch minimum tax.23 They transferred subsidiaries from Dutch group companies to their US parent. It was pointed out that US and Chinese companies could make use of the Transitional UTPR Safe Harbour24 until 2026 as those countries did not implement the Pillar 2 rules. A Dutch tax adviser, who used to work at the OECD, observed in the news item that this safe harbour leads to a competitive disadvantage for EU multinationals who cannot escape the tax. She considered it likely that the US would exercise pressure to obtain a new exemption before 2026, meaning that US multinationals remain able to escape the tax. This might also mean that the tax might bring in even less income for the Dutch government than this reduced estimation.
The Dutch tax administration estimated the structural costs to collect the tax at € 9.5 million and warned that it might be difficult to attract enough competent staff and that it would lead to reprioritization in the IT portfolio.25 Given the problems of shortage of staff in the Dutch labour market, in general, but also in the field of tax and IT, this might also mean that the tax administration cannot perform other tasks or – given the partly outdated IT systems of the tax administration – improvements of the other IT systems which might be of more importance for collecting tax revenue.
Ministry of Finance, Ramingstoelichting. Toelichting op de raming van het budgettaire effect van het Wetsvoorstel Wet minimumbelasting 2024 (Pijler 2), https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2023/05/31/ramingstoelichting-wet-minimumbelasting-inclusief-certificering-cpb.
Miljoenennota 2024, p. 49, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/begrotingen/2023/09/19/miljoenennota-2024/Miljoenennota-2024.pdf.
Gidi Pols, ‘Amerikaanse multinationals ontwijken Nederlandse bijheffing minimumbelasting’, NOS Nieuws 11 January 2024, https://nos.nl/artikel/2504462-amerikaanse-multinationals-ontwijken-nederlandse-bijheffing-minimumbelasting.
OECD, Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy – Administrative Guidance on the Global Anti-Base Erosion Model Rules (Pillar Two), OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS, (July 2023), chapter 5.2, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/administrative-guidance-global-anti-base-erosion-rules-pillar-two-july-2023.pdf.
Kamerstukken II, 2022–2023, 36369, no. 3, p. 57.
4 Guidance
4.1 Later OECD guidance
Amendments of the OECD/IF, including the administrative guidelines, do not have direct effect in the Dutch legal order as neither the IF nor the OECD can establish binding legislation.26 In relation to the OECD Commentary on the OECD Model Convention, the Dutch Supreme Court ruled that changes made in the Commentary after a certain tax treaty was concluded, are not relevant for the interpretation of the provision in the specific treaty if the changes go further than a mere clarification of the specific provision in the Model Convention. The Supreme Court observed that another view would entail that establishing or amending the content of obligations arising for the Netherlands from a tax treaty, is withdrawn from the competent bodies designated as such by or pursuant to the constitution.27 This means that the Dutch Supreme Court would probably also not accept a dynamic interpretation of the OECD model rules. The Dutch government announced it will assess on a case-by-case basis whether the Dutch minimum tax legislation or the explanation of that legislation must be amended and assured that it would keep an eye on democratic checks in this respect.28
In 2024, the Netherlands implemented elements of the February, July and December 2023 and June 2024 OECD administrative guidance on Pillar 229 in the Minimum Taxation Act 2024 with retro-active effect to 31 December 2023.30 Originally, these amendments were made in a so-called compilation legislative proposal that included various technical changes in many different laws.31 However, the Council of State urged to include these changes in a separate proposal as these were complex and relatively substantive.32 In this respect, the Council of State referred, amongst others, to Sweden, that did include the amendments in a separate legislative proposal.33 As a result of this advice, the amendments were sent to parliament as a separate proposal. Furthermore, the Council of State questioned that the proposed legislative changes had not been included in a public consultation. The government gave as reasons for omitting such consultation the timing of the publication of the guidance, its complexity and the aim of the government to implement Pillar 2 rules as soon as possible and to use all time available to draft high quality legislation.34 In addition, the government was of the view that there was little leeway to deviate from the Pillar 2 model rules.
This legislation included OECD guidance elements that the government deemed to go further than mere clarification and which needed a legal basis. Elements that in the view of the government go further than mere clarification, but for which the Minimum Taxation Act 2024 allows implementation by delegated act, were included in the Implementing Decree Minimum Tax 2024.35 The reason for these implementations is to enable a consistent application of the OECD model rules and to avoid discrepancies with the application in other states.36 The implementations closely follow the OECD guidelines. However, it does mean that the Dutch regulations now include rules that are not part of the Pillar 2 Directive as the Directive was not changed after publication of the OECD guidelines. De Wilde questions how long Netherlands will be able to reconcile the OECD guidance and the national legislation.37
Kamerstukken I, 2023–2024, 36369, E, p. 1.
Hoge Raad 14 October 2022, nr 21/00747, ECLI:NL:HR:2022:1436.
Kamerstukken I, 2023–2024, 36369, C, p. 4 and Kamerstukken I, 2023–2024, 36 369, E, p. 2.
https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/global-minimum-tax/global-anti-base-erosion-model-rules-pillar-two.html.
Wet aanpassing Wet minimumbelasting 2024, Staatsblad 2024, 438.
Wetsvoorstel Overige fiscale maatregelen 2025.
Raad van State, Advies inzake Wijziging van enkele belastingwetten en enige andere wetten (Belastingplan 2025), 9 September 2024, W06.24.00239/III, https://www.raadvanstate.nl/adviezen/@145587/w06-24-00239-iii/.
Footnote 11 of the aforementioned advice.
Kamerstukken II, 2024–2025, 36609, 3, p. 7.
Uitvoeringsbesluit minimumbelasting 2024, Staatsblad 2024, 442.
Explanatory notes to Uitvoeringsbesluit minimumbelasting 2024, Staatsblad 2024, 442, p. 9.
M.F. de Wilde, Uitvoeringsbesluit minimumbelasting 2024, NTFR 2025/60.
4.2 Guidance of the Dutch tax administration
To help taxpayers and tax inspectors, the International Unit of the Large Enterprises Division of the Dutch tax administration established a Pillar 2 central expertise team. Together with local tax inspectors, this team is responsible for the implementation of the rules. It must also safeguard equal interpretation of the rules by different tax inspectors. Taxpayers can contact the expertise team directly through an email address (pijler2@belastingdienst.nl).
The tax administration provides for general guidance in a pdf on its website with links to the underlying Pillar 2 documents, such as OECD model rules and guidance, the Pillar 2 Directive and Dutch legislative documents.38 According to a LinkedIn post of the tax administration announcing the launch of this knowledge database, it is intended to add answers to frequently asked questions in due course. The LinkedIn post also mentions that the document will be regularly updated to provide for up-to-date information.39
Furthermore, the sub-knowledgegroup40 Pillar 2 of the tax administration published various so called ‘knowledgegroup positions’ on its website.41 Taxpayers can rely on these positions.
Legal certainty on the application of the IIR and UTPR can be obtained through a tax ruling under the rules and requirements generally applicable to international tax rulings. This also means that a ruling can only be obtained if the multinational group has economic nexus in the Netherlands and the applying company has operational activities for which it runs financial risks and for which sufficient staff is available in the Netherlands. The activities must suit the function of the company in the group. It also means that, for example, no ruling can be obtained if the only or decisive reason for a transaction is to reduce Dutch or foreign tax or if the requesting company, one of its directors or ultimate beneficial owner/intermediate holding company with an interest of at least 5%, is included in the Consolidated lists of EU financial sanctions or of persons, groups and entities subject to EU financial sanctions. In the Decree on international rulings it was added that the tax inspector must include the expertise team Pillar 2 when dealing with such ruling request.42 An anonymous summary of the ruling is published on a website of the tax administration. Such summary is also published if a ruling is not obtained, but preliminary consultations with the tax administration have taken place. The first Pillar 2 ruling was dated 23 April 2024.43
According to De Wilde, with these positions and rulings the Dutch tax administration shows to be willing and maybe even courageous with respect to providing legal certainty on the application of the minimum tax rules.44 He observes that states that do not agree with these positions might levy a top-up tax. During the parliamentary discussions on the minimum tax, the government held that a mutual agreement procedure (MAP) could be started to solve a dispute on the interpretation of Pillar 2 rules45 and that most bilateral tax treaties contain a provision that allows countries to start a MAP on taxes not mentioned in the treaty.46 This would, of course, require that the specific tax treaty contains a provision similar to article 25 OECD MC. However, if differences in interpretation of the rules do not lead to an additional tax, bilateral tax treaties do not seem to provide for a MAP. When questioned on this point, the government pointed out that the Pillar 2 Directive was based on the OECD model rules which were agreed on in the IF and that there is little policy room to deviate from these model rules. In addition, the government noted that the IF provides for safeguards such as technical assistance in the implementation of the rules if differing interpretations would arise.47
The Dutch government prefers a multilateral agreement on dispute resolution over relying on the MAP in bilateral treaties,48 and promised parliament it was committed to further such a multilateral agreement.49 If that would not be feasible, the government advocated an examination on whether an amendment of the EU Dispute Resolution Directive50 would be desirable and feasible to at least solve disputes in the EU.51 The government also mentioned that arbitration only seems to be possible in very few specific cases where countries differ in the interpretation of Pillar 2 rules.52 The government would prefer an OECD solution over a Dutch or EU solution, also for arbitration, as this would be most efficient and effective if all IF-members would commit to it.53
De Wilde also warned that because of the positions and rulings on the minimum tax, the European Commission might initiate infringement procedures against the Netherlands and that the European Parliament might deem the positions to be problematic as they mean that the Netherlands will not levy a top-up tax.54 He observed that the minimum tax is part of the acquis Communautaire and that no EU institution, not even the European Commission or the Council has given legally binding guidance on the interpretation of the minimum tax. He notes that only the EU legislator and the Court of Justice may elevate OECD guidance to EU law. This could mean that the group positions may be deemed to be non-binding.
Belastingdienst, Kennisbank Wet Minimumbelasting 2024, https://download.belastingdienst.nl/belastingdienst/docs/kennisdatabank-pijler2-brb0201z1fd.pdf.
https://www.linkedin.com/posts/belastingdienst-grote-ondernemingen_pijler2-pillar2-activity-7143950596562173952-_6mt?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop.
In Dutch: kennisgroep. The Dutch tax administration has 26 knowledgegroups on all taxes. These consist of tax inspectors that have specialised in the field of the knowledgegroup, such as income tax, VAT, wage tax etc. If an individual tax inspector has a legal question on how to interpret the tax legislation, he can ask the relevant knowledgegroup for a point of view. The point of view is binding on the tax inspector, but not on the tax payer (or the courts) and is not directed at a specific tax payer. All positions are published on a website of the tax administration (https://kennisgroepen.belastingdienst.nl/). It is not possible to file an appeal against the positions. However, it is of course possible to file an appeal against a tax assessment in which a position was applied. See also Tirza Cramwinckel, Publicatie van kennisgroepstandpunten door de Belastingdienst nader bekeken, Ars Aequi April 2025, p. 277–289.
https://kennisgroepen.belastingdienst.nl/?sfid=72&_sfm_belastingsoort=Minimumbelasting%20(WMB). Before 1 April 2025, five points of view were published, four in 2024 (KG:911:2024:4, KG:911:2024:3, KG:911:2024:2 and KG:911:2024:1, and one in 2025, KG:911:2025:1.
Article 2.1 Besluit vooroverleg rulings met een internationaal karakter, as amended on 19 December 2023, nr. 2023-0000020007, Staatscourant 2023, 2574 https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0042342/2023-12-22.
Belastingdienst, ruling, 23 April 2024, 20240423-rulov-000005, https://download.belastingdienst.nl/belastingdienst/docs/rul-20240423-rulov-000005.pdf.
M.F. de Wilde, Standpunt sub-kennisgroep Belastingdienst Pijler 2 invulling begrip doorkijkentiteit Wmb 2024, NTFR 2025/61.
Kamerstukken II, 2022–2023, 36369, no. 6, p. 38.
Kamerstukken II, 2022–2023, 36369, no. 6, p. 18.
Kamerstukken II, 2022–2023, 36369, no. 3, p. 59.
Kamerstukken II, 2022–2023, 36369, no. 3, p. 59.
Kamerstukken II, 2022–2023, 36369, no. 6, p. 15.
Council Directive (EU) 2017/1852 of 10 October 2017 on tax dispute resolution mechanisms in the European Union.
Kamerstukken I, 2023–2024, 36369, C, p. 16.
Kamerstukken II, 2022–2023, 36369, no. 6, p. 14, https://www.eerstekamer.nl/behandeling/20230922/nota_naar_aanleiding_van_het_2/document3/f=/vm6smbqnvmoe.pdf.
Kamerstukken II, 2022–2023, 36369, no. 6, p. 15.
M.F. de Wilde, Standpunt sub-kennisgroep Belastingdienst Pijler 2 invulling begrip doorkijkentiteit Wmb 2024, NTFR 2025/61.
5 Minimum tax regarded a covered tax under Dutch tax treaties and no notification to treaty partners
In the Netherlands, tax treaties have precedence over national law. The Dutch government is of the opinion that as the minimum tax is a profit tax, it is covered under bilateral tax treaties even if it is not mentioned specifically.55 The Dutch government did also not see a need to notify tax treaty partners of the introduction of the minimum tax in order for the minimum tax to be covered under the treaty. Reasons the government gave were that through the OECD working groups tax treaty partners are aware that the Netherlands implemented the minimum tax, that the implementation is subject to a peer review under the auspices of the IF, and that the OECD would keep track of implementation in the various jurisdictions and would probably publish this.56 For these reasons such notification was deemed not to have an added value and was also deemed unnecessary. The Netherlands did not seek agreement with other countries on this point of view.57 This, notwithstanding the fact that in line with article 2(4) of the OECD Model Convention (OECD MC) the Netherlands has agreed to notify the competent authorities of the other contracting state of any significant changes that have been made in their taxation laws. Regardless of remarks on this in the literature58 and of the Council of State,59 such notification has not taken place for the minimum tax, neither to existing treaty partners, nor to new treaty partners with which the treaty was concluded just before the minimum tax was introduced.60 The Netherlands did notify the Kyrgyz Republic with which a treaty was concluded on 5 December 2023, as it is not a member of the IF.61
Kamerstukken II, 2022–2023, 36369, no. 3, p. 47–48, no. 4, p. 8–9, no. 6 p. 14.
Kamerstukken II, 2021–2022, 22112, no. 3339, p. 5–6 https://www.eerstekamer.nl/eu/behandeling/20220317/verslag_van_een_schriftelijk/document3/f=/vlrejearsavf.pdf and Kamerstukken II, 2022–2023, 36369, no. 4, p. 11–12.
Kamerstukken II, 2022–2023, 36369, no. 6, p. 50.
J.R. Goudsmit & L.C. van Hulten, ‘Pijler 2: enkele verdragsaspecten’. Weekblad Fiscaal Recht, 2023/41.
For example in the advice on the tax treaty with Andorra which was signed on 12 October 2023: Raad van State, Advies inzake het Verdrag tussen het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden en het Vorstendom Andorra tot het vermijden van dubbele belasting (Trb. 2023, 128), 31 January 2024, W02.23.00353/II, https://www.raadvanstate.nl/adviezen/@140574/w02-23-00353-ii/.
This is, for example, mentioned explicitely in the explanatory note to the treaty with Moldavia which was signed in September 2023 (Staatscourant 2024, 33586), and in the explanatory note of the treaty with Andorra that was signed on 12 October 2023 (Staatscourant 2024, 32379).
Kamerstukken II, 2024–2025, 36633, no. 1 (explanatory note section II.2).
6 Wide, extraterritorial liability for the minimum tax
The Netherlands has introduced a wide liability for the Dutch minimum tax in the Collection of State Taxes Act (Invorderingswet 1990).62 A group entity is personally and fully liable for any Dutch minimum tax due by other group entities. This includes group entities resident abroad. This wide tax liability is not part of the OECD/IF Pillar 2 model rules, nor of the Pillar 2 Directive: it is purely a Dutch invention. In November 2023, the government acknowledged that it did not know of any other country that would implement such a liability provision.63
This wide liability is also unique in the Dutch tax system. It seems to be inspired by the similar liability for group companies that are part of a corporate income tax or value added tax fiscal unity. However, that liability only applies to entities that are part of the Dutch fiscal unity which in case of a corporate income tax fiscal unity is always based on a specific request. The liability for the Dutch minimum tax applies to all group companies, without a possibility to opt out and no matter where these companies are resident. This means that if a Dutch group company does not pay the minimum tax due, the Netherlands may hold a foreign group company liable to pay the tax of the Dutch company. According to the government, this will only happen if no Dutch group company can be held liable. The government regards this wide, extraterritorial liability as fitting the character of the minimum tax as it is (partly) dependent on the effective tax rate of the group in other jurisdictions. In addition, the wide liability is regarded as necessary to mitigate the risk of non-recovery of the minimum tax.64
In case the foreign company the Netherlands holds liable refuses to pay, the Netherlands may ask65 the resident jurisdiction for recovery assistance, either based on a bilateral tax treaty, the EU Recovery Assistance Directive66 or the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (CMAATM).67 Again, the Dutch government is of the opinion that whether or not the minimum tax is mentioned in a bilateral tax treaty, a treaty based on the OECD MC can be used for recovery assistance as article 27(1) of the OECD MC does not limit recovery assistance to taxes covered in the treaty. Nevertheless, apart from the fact that several countries made reservations on the CMAATM regarding recovery assistance, one might question whether other jurisdictions would be willing to provide assistance to the Netherlands to recover the tax due by a Dutch group company from a company resident in their jurisdiction as this wide tax liability is not included in the Pillar 2 model rules, but purely based on Dutch choices in the implementation of the minimum tax. This question was raised both by the Council of State and parliament. The government answered parliament that first the possibilities of EU legislation will be explored, then those of a bilateral tax treaty and finally those of the CMAATM. The government acknowledged that it is not certain whether a request for recovery assistance will be successful as that depends on various factors such as the legal basis for the request, the working arrangements with the other state which may include further requirements such as certain thresholds, possibilities for redress and the recovery capacity of the requested state.68 The Netherlands will focus on group entities that will be able to pay the tax, such as the parent company and on countries with the highest success rate of a request for recovery assistance. The government acknowledged that in absence of a legal basis, the Netherlands depends on the willingness of the non-resident group company to pay the tax.69
Article 41a Invorderingswet 1990.
Kamerstukken I, 2023–2024, 36369, C, p. 13, https://www.eerstekamer.nl/behandeling/20231117/nota_naar_aanleiding_van_het_15/document3/f=/vm89odhym8yc_opgemaakt.pdf.
Kamerstukken II, 2022–2023, 36369, no. 3, p. 47–48 and no. 4, p. 8–9.
Kamerstukken II, 2022–2023, 36369, no. 6, p. 39.
Council Directive 2010/24/EU of 16 March 2010 concerning mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to taxes, duties and other measures.
Article 31 of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters of 25 January 1988 as amended by the 2010 Protocol, https://www.oecd.org/tax/the-multilateral-convention-on-mutual-administrative-assistance-in-tax-matters-9789264115606-en.htm.
Kamerstukken II, 2022–2023, 36369, no. 6, p. 48–49; 79–80, Kamerstukken I, 2023–2024, 36369, C, p. 13.
Kamerstukken II, 2022–2023, 36369, no. 6, p. 79–80.
7 Conclusion
The parliamentary debate on the Pillar 2 minimum tax only started in the Netherlands when the point of no return had already been passed. Some members of parliament seem to start to feel uneasy about the minimum tax and the effects it may have on the Netherlands. The estimated income for the Netherlands has already been decreased and might turn out to be even less than this amended amount. The administrative burden, both on the tax administration and the business community is high and one might wonder whether the societal costs of the tax outweigh its benefits. The Dutch tax administration tries to support the business community with guidance, but it remains to be seen whether this is in accordance with the guidance of other member states and whether the European Commission will permit providing such guidance. In the meantime, the OECD guidance is implemented in the Duitch legislation, meaning that is starting to deviate from the Pillar 2 Directive, which also raises questions on whether or not implementing this later OECD guidance means that the Netherlands infringes the Pillar 2 Directive. It also remains to be seen whether other jurisdictions agree with the Netherlands that a notification of treaty partners of the introduction of the minimum tax is unnecessary and whether they will be willing to assist the Netherlands in recovering the tax for which the Netherlands has, unilaterally, introduced a wide, extraterritorial liability.
Sigrid Hemels is a full professor of Tax Law at Erasmus University Rotterdam School of Law, State Councillor in the Advisory Division of the Dutch Council of State, affiliated to Lund University School of Economics and Management, and International Fellow in the 2024–2025 Theme Digitax at the Pufendorf Institute for Advanced Studies, Lund University.